american newspaper new York Times (NYT) this Friday released a recent report from Israel’s intelligence service Mossad, According to which the two attacks in Buenos Aires were carried out by agents of the pro-Iranian Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, but without the involvement of Argentine citizens or Iranian embassy personnel. The text states that Israeli intelligence still thinks that Tehran sanctioned the attacks, financed them and may have trained commandos who came to Argentina to carry out the attacks, but recent investigations refute that. Which has been confirmed over the years and years. , Among the shocking points of the report known in Israel It is mentioned that the explosives entered the country in shampoo bottles and chocolate boxes, and a very unreliable information that has been previously assumed is repeated: that the explosives were hidden in a square or park. According to the NYT, the report itself is critical of the Mossad for not foreseeing the attacks. At the AMIA prosecutor’s office, apparently they are not going to be directed, according to a newspaper, but they will request reports from Israel. It so happens that if I had actual, judicial evidence, Mohsin Rabbani, the former cultural attache of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires and now believed to be the mastermind of the attacks, Hadi Soleimanpour, former ambassador, and Ahmed Asghari, third secretary of the embassy. , all of them charged by prosecutor Alberto Nisman, among others.
In particular, Mossad says that many Hezbollah commandos from Buenos Aires participated in the preparation and execution of an attack against the Israeli embassy, without the help of Argentines or Iranians. “Iran did not have an operational role in the attacks in Argentina”Made headlines in many Israeli newspapers.
According to the text known this Friday:
*The head of operations was a certain Hassan Haraki, who used Brazilian documents to enter the country and purchase a Ford F-100 truck that exploded at the diplomatic headquarters of Suipacha and Arroyo. Actually, the vehicle was bought by Juan B. A certain was purchased at a used car dealership on Justo Avenue with a document called Ribeiro da Luz.
* There was a second Hezbollah operative chief, Talal Hamiyah, who also came to Buenos Aires for the attack. The text released by the NYT speaks of other members of the operative group who left the country the day after the attack.
* The suicide – always as Mossad reports – was a certain Muhammad Nur al-Din, 24, Lebanese, who had immigrated to Brazil a few years earlier and agreed to become a suicide driver.
“The Israeli investigation indicates that the explosives used in the two attacks were brought to Argentina by Hezbollah operatives in shampoo bottles and chocolate boxes. They were taken on commercial flights from various European countries. Then they hid in a square. “The chemicals used to assemble the bombs were purchased by a commercial company used as cover for Hezbollah’s operations in South America,” Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman wrote in the NYT.
None of this can be verified and it hardly seems reliable. In the case of AMIA, 300 kg of ammonal was used, a fertilizer that certainly did not come from abroad. Perhaps dynamite was used as a starter. The Israeli embassy required fewer kilos, possibly 80, and it was never fully determined whether it was trotyl, pentrite or hexogen. In the case of the diplomatic headquarters, experts said the explosive came from a military unit. In any case, it doesn’t seem very logical that they brought explosives in shampoo bottles and boxes of chocolates—explosives are a type of cream—to run the risk of being discovered or by accident, as this material is available in the country. .. Even less believable is that he hid it in a park or square, places of public access.
From what was written in New York and Israel, the text is critical of the Mossad for not warning of the attacks in advance. This is especially true in the case of AMIA, as was the precedent of the embassy. The report contains an important detail: it indicates that after the first attack, in March 1992, the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires was carefully monitored and no strange movement was observed. So the second attack surprised him. This is one of the basic elements by which they confirm that there was no local connection, neither Iranian nor Argentine.
If the Mossad text was given judicial legitimacy, the charges against Rabbani, Solemapur and Asgari, Iranian officials living in Buenos Aires, would fall. The cultural attaché was always pointed to by the East Side and Nisman as the organizers of the attack and the allegations were perpetuated with the argument that he had called Lebanon over the phone. A question that seems quite ridiculous was also used as evidence: Rabbani in November 1993 by Juan B. Went to ask the price of a van on Justo Avenue. He did this by dressing in religious habits, unimaginable to anyone planning an attack.
In any case, the AMIA case is permanently linked to intelligence reports., There is almost no judicial evidence on file and it would be necessary to see whether the Mossad report provides any more precise elements: for example, through which companies the shampoo and chocolate boxes were imported, what documents were obtained by Hezbollah. Was used operators to enter country or other data that allows you to check something. It is difficult 30 years after the attack on the embassy and 28 years after the Jewish mutual attack. NYT text says that The report itself is a blow to the investigations conducted so far by the United States, Israel and Argentina. It clearly says so.