The Supreme Court of Canada accepted the appeal filed by the prosecutor’s office, ruling that the delay in the first trial does not apply to the second. The defendant should allege undue delay in the same suit and not in a separate suit.
The defendant was charged with 7 counts of sexual abuse against minors, though he was acquitted of all of them. Six years passed between its formalities and acquittal. Not satisfied with this decision, the prosecutor’s office appealed the decision. court whom Allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial.
In turn, the man filed an action to suspend the proceedings. He alleged an undue delay during the first trial which ended with his acquittal, which would be added to the delay in the second criminal proceedings against him. The court accepted their claim after affirming a violation of Article 11 of the Bill of Rights, which stipulates that the accused must be produced within a “reasonable time period”.
court whom states in its resolution that “(…) the delay of each trial should be considered separately. It would be necessary to consider the delay for a new trial only if the delay in the first trial was justified. However, in the specific case , the delay in the first trial was unjustified. Therefore, the defendant’s request can be accepted. The prosecutor’s office appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
In its analysis of the merits, the Court found that “(…) based on the “Jordan” precedent, limits were established on the time that should mediate between a person’s allegation and the conclusion of his or her trial. Preliminary Inquiry The statute of limitations in provincial court after trial is 30 months. It is generally held that a defendant who raises the impropriety of delay after trial, and especially after sentencing, is not acting in a timely manner. However, condonation of delay cannot be inferred merely from the defendant’s silence or inaction. In order for the court to determine that the delay is condoned, the defendant must have taken some direct action that would reasonably demonstrate consent to the delay. can be guessed.”
It states that “(…) although the instance requires that the defendant take reasonable measures in a timely manner, it cannot file a motion during a new trial on the grounds of delay in its first trial. In action Delay hinders the proper administration of justice and contributes to the perpetuation of inefficient practices that have a negative impact on the justice system and its limited resources. Filing of a motion in a new trial to stay the proceedings on the basis of the delay of the first trial contrary to the duty of the parties to take proactive steps. While a defendant does not have a legal obligation to assert his right to trial within a reasonable time for the right to exist, it does not entitle the defendant to do anything when He feels that his authority is not being respected.
This indicates that “(…) after a new trial is ordered the defendants cannot extend the delay of the first trial. The effect count is reset to zero when the second starts. However, in some exceptional circumstances a fresh A court may consider the delay of a first trial when assessing the reasonableness of the delay in trial. After the order of a new trial, the defendant recovers the status of a person accused of an offence. After such order The delay is a delay in the trial and therefore falls within the Jordan proceedings, so the presumptive ceilings set forth in the precedent apply to the delay in the re-trial.”
In sum, the Court concludes that “(…) the defendant did not act in a timely manner. He requested a stay only months before his new trial was to take place. As a result, the delay in your first trial is counted as the total delay.” May not be included in the calculation. Only delays from ordering a new test are counted. Total delay between ordering a new test and the actual or anticipated end of that test, 10 months and 5 days, estimated at 30 months is well below the threshold. None of the factors connected with this specific reference support a finding that the defendant’s right to trial within a reasonable time was violated: the anticipated retrial delay is too short and the matter was given priority The delay is justified and there is no ground for adjournment of the proceedings.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court decided to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.